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cash. They wanted to stay with the company instead of being paid off.
The case is referred to with approval in the judgment of the Court of
Appeal but it is not the present case and I do not think it should receive
approval in this Court.
The trap was set by the compelling circumstances of the case at hand;
it is to the Court's credit that it declined to be caught.
D.B.S.
Esso Standard (Inter-America) Inc. v. J. W. Enterprises et al., [1963]
S.C.R. 144.
In the case of Esso Standard (Inter-America) Inc. v. J. W. Enter-
prises Inc. et al. and M. A. Morrisroe,1 the Supreme Court of Canada
considered the meaning of s. 128 of the Dominion Companies Act 2
and declared it to be intra vires the Parliament of Canada.
The facts may be briefly stated. Esso Standard, a Delaware
corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil Company,
a New Jersey corporation, sent an offer to the shareholders of Inter-
national Petroleum Company Limited, incorporated under the Com-
panies Act R.S.C. 1952, c. 53, to purchase all the outstanding shares
of that company, as provided by s. 128(1) of the Companies Act.
S. 128 provides:
(1) Where any contract involving the transfer of shares in a company
to any other company... has, within four months after the making
of the offer in that behalf by the transferee company, been 'approved by
the holders of not less than nine-tenths of the shares affected ... , the
transferee company may . . . give notice . . . to any dissenting share-
holder that it desires to acquire his shares, and where such notice is
given, the transferee company is, unless on an application made by the
dissenting shareholder within one month from the date on which the
notice was given the court thinks fit to order otherwise, entitled andb und to acquire those shares on the terms on which, under the contract,
the shares of the approving shareholders are to be transferred to the
transferee company.
In their offer, Esso Standard, the transferee company, stated that
Standard Oil, the owner of 96 per cent of the outstanding shares of
International Petroleum, intended to accept the offer. Esso Standard
would thus be in a position to give notice under s. 128(1) for the
compulsory acquisition of the shares of all shareholders who did not
accept the offer. Less than 90 per cent of the free shares accepted
within the required time.
Esso Standard obtained an ex parte order from the court under
s. 128. The present case arose when the present respondents moved
for an order setting aside the ex parte order. The Court of Appeal,
Schroeder, J.A. dissenting, allowed appeals from Wells, J. who had
dismissed the motions, and declared that "Esso-Standard (Inter-
America) Inc., is not entitled nor bound to acquire the shares of the
1 [19631 S.C.R. 144.
2R.S.C. 1952, c. 53.
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appellants or any of them in International Petroleum Company
Limited".3 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Judson J.,
delivering a unanimous judgment of the Court, upheld the decision
of the Court of Appeal.
It is submitted the most interesting argument of the respondents
in the Supreme Court was that s. 128 of the Companies Act was
ultra vires the Parliament of Canada. In the Court of Appeal counsel
for the appellant Morrisroe, Mr. Sheard, contended that s. 128 was
ultra vires because it was related to property and civil rights. He
urged that it overrode the general law of the Province in which the
shares had their "situs," and provided for the compulsory transfer
of such shares.
s. 128 does not produce any reorganization of the company or any com-
promise of anyone's rights against it. It leaves the company exactly as
it was before. The Section provides for the forcible transfer of the chose
in action from one person to another and the sole connection the section
has with company law is that it is a share of a company incorporated
under the Companies Act, that is, the chose in action in question.4
The courts rejected the argument of Mr. Sheard and unanimously
upheld the validity of the legislation. They held that it was truly
legislation in relation to the incorporation of companies with other
than Provincial objects, and was not legislation in relation to property
and civil rights. They felt that legislative power to prescribe the
manner in which shares of the capital of such companies can be
transferred and acquired was incidental to the powers of the Dominion
to incorporate companies, and was of general interest throughout
the Dominion. Judson J. stated that in his opinion, the case was
completely covered by the Supreme Court decision: Reference re
Constitutional Validity of s. 110 of the Dominion Companies Act,5
[1934] S.C.R. 653, 4 D.L.R. 6.
In that case s. 110, dealing with Directors' liability for declaring
and paying a dividend when the company is insolvent, or when the
payment of the dividend would render the company insolvent or
which impairs the capital of the company, was held intra vires of
the Parliament of Canada. It was settled in John Deere Plow Co. v.
Wharton,6 that the subject matter "Incorporation of Companies with
objects not provincial" is a subject which falls within the residuary
clause of s. 91 because it is excluded from those embraced within s. 92
by the terms of that section. The John Deere case also laid down that
"Incorporation of Companies" cannot be read in a manner so strict
as to limit it to the subject of bringing such companies into being.
It must necessarily include powers incidental to the operation of
companies. Following this reasoning Duff, C.J. held s. 110 intra vires.
After canvassing the purpose of the legislation, with reference to
3 (1963) 33 D.L.R. (2d) 658, sub nom. Re InternaZ Petroleum Co. Ltd.
4 Ibid., cf. p. 712 (O.R.).
5 [1934] S.C.R. 653; 4 D.L.R. 6.
6 [1915] A.C. 330.
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Lord Lindley's book on the law of companies, he concluded that "you
are strictly within what might properly be called the defining of the
constitution of the company when you are making provision.., for
the protection of the assets of the company in the interests of the
creditors of the company; ... and particularly, when in the interests
of persons dealing with the company, you are providing safeguards
against the improper and colourable employment by the managers
or the shareholders of their powers in wasting the assets of the
company."'7 Clearly, in that case the section was intra vires.
Judson J. stated that the Esso Standard case was completely
covered by the reasons of the court in re Reference 110. It would
appear to be a better view to distinguish the cases. S. 110 appears
to go to the "internal" control of the company, to the status of a com-
pany qua company. On the other hand, as counsel for the appellant
argued, s. 128 does not affect the status of the company at all, but
only its control and management. The courts have never attempted
to define what is covered by the term "internal management", but it
has been decided, s for example, that where the transfer of a con-
trolling interest in the company is involved, the question-in that
case whether the chairman who gave his casting vote had been prop-
erly appointed-is not to be regarded as a matter of internal manage-
ment.9 This would seem to indicate it is not therefore a matter
incidental to the status of the company, but is rather a question of
property and civil rights. If, in the s. 110 case, the directors were
permitted to impair the capital of the company, the existence of the
company itself would be threatened. In contrast, s. 128 involves only
the transfer of ownership in the company leaving the company itself,
as a legal entity, unaffected. The members of the Board of Directors
may change, but the company itself still exists and carries on business.
Thus in my view, the legislation is ultra vires the Parliament of
Canada, being not in relation to the incorporation of companies with
other than provincial objects, but rather in relation to the proprietory
rights of the owners and directors. However, the Supreme Court of
Canada rejected this argument holding that power to transfer shares
was incidental to the power to incorporate companies.
After holding s. 128 intra vires the Parliament of Canada, the
court interpreted the section in the light of the facts. Judson J. agreed
with Laidlaw, J.A. that "the court should grant the dissenting share-
holders' application for 'order otherwise' for the reasons given by
the Court of Appeal in England in the case of In re Bugle Press
Limited." 0 In his opinion there was no distinction between Bugle
Press and the present case before the court either on fact or law.
In the Bugle Press case, two majority shareholders wishing to buy
out a minority shareholder who rejected their first offer of purchase,
7 Supra, footnote 5 at p. 569 (S.C.R.).
S Mark v. Workman, [1920] 1 I.R. 107.
9 Wegenast, Canadian Companies 1931, p. 327.10 [1961] 1 Ch. 270.
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caused a transferee company, of which they held all the outstanding
shares, to be incorporated. The transferee company acquired 90 per
cent of the shares of the transferor company from the two majority
shareholders, and then gave notice of its intention to exercise its
powers of compulsory acquisition under s. 209 of the Companies Act,
1948. The minority shareholder moved for a declaration similar to
the one sought in the present case. It was held that the minority was
entitled to an order as sought on the ground that in the circumstances
of the particular case the onus was on the transferee company to
show that the scheme was one which the minority shareholder ought
to be compelled to accept. They could not satisfy this onus. The
mapority shareholders were trying to do indirectly what they could
not do directly with the result that the whole proceeding was, as
Laidlaw stated in the Ontario case, a sham with a foregone conclusion
for the purpose of expropriating a minority interest on terms set
by the majority. This the Court would not allow.
Both Laidlaw, J.A. in the Court of Appeal and Judson, J. in the
Supreme Court of Canada applied the Bugle Press case to the Esso
Standard situation and held that Esso Standard failed to meet the
onus placed upon it to meet the prima facie case made out by the
appellants. Therefore the discretion of the Statute was exercised in
their favour.
It is my submission that the courts were wrong in finding the
facts of the Esso Standard case to be within the four corners of Bugle
Press. The main problem here is the interpretation of s. 128.
In the Sussex Carriage'1 case, the modern rule of Statutory
Interpretation was laid down. There it was held that where the words
of the statute are clear, it is the duty of the court to give effect to
them without regard to the consequences, and even if the rule does
not seem expedient to them.
In interpreting s. 128 in the light of the facts of the present case,
the Courts seem to have chosen to disregard the plain meaning of the
words in the Section, and added a gloss in the light of what they
think the words ought to mean. In my respectful submission, this
is not the function of the courts. Their function in interpreting
statutes is to give effect to what the legislature says, even if it
effects what, in their opinion, is a wrong result. Only if there is
some ambiguity or absurdity are the courts in a position to "legis-
late." City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island. 2
In both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada,
reference was made to the fact that s. 128 of the Dominion Companies
Act, first enacted in 1934, is based upon s. 209 of the English Com-
panies Act of 1948 enacted in 1929. The history and contents of the
11 (1841) 11 C1. & F. 85; 8 E.R. 1034; 65 R.R. 811.
12 [19211 A.C. 384; 90 L.J.P.C. 213; 59 D.L.R. 399.
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English section was reviewed, and its purpose as found by Evershed,
M.R. was quoted by Laidlaw, J.A.:
that what the section is directed to is a case where there is a scheme or
contract for the acquistion of a company, its amalgamation, reorganiza-
tion or the like, and where the offeror is independent of the shareholdersin the transferor company or at least independent of that part or fraction
of them from which the 90 per cent is to be derived.'3
Following the English Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of
Canada held that s. 128 was not intended to operate where there was
no bona fide transfer between independent parties where there was no
meeting of independent minds. Applying this rule to the facts in
this case they held that because Esso Standard was a wholly owned
subsidiary of Standard Oil, any transfer between them was not a
transfer between independent companies as required by the sections,
but was an inter-company arrangement and a sham arranged solely
for the purpose of imposing a majority will, as in the Bugle Press
case, and compelling other shareholders of the company to part with
shares which they were unwilling to sell.
However, I submit that the cases are distinguishable. In Bugle
Press, the transferee company was created specifically for the purpose
of acquiring the majority shares. They could not do indirectly what
they could not do directly. In contrast, Esso was not incorporated
for the purpose of making the offer in question, but always carried
on, and is still carrying on, other commercial undertakings.
The principle was first enunciated in Salomon v. Salomon &
Co.14 that every validly constituted corporation is a legal entity,
a corporate person distinct and separate from its Board of Directors.
In the Bugle Press case the court decided that while the transferee
company was a distinct and separate entity from its two shareholders,
it was in substance the same, they were its alter ego. In the Esso
Standard case, however, the subsidiary and its parent were separate
legal entities. While there may have been an identity of interest
between the two companies it seems irrelevant in interpreting the
plain words of the section, unless it can be proved that they had
identical Boards of Directors and that Standard Oil was really the
alter ego of Esso Standard. Such facts were not alleged. The Statute
says: "Where any contract involving the transfer of shares... in a
company . . . to any other company. . .". Here there were two inde-
pendent companies. The fact that one was a wholly owned subsidiary
of the other should not enable the court to impose a condition into
the Statute to bring about what they consider is a fair result. It is
not the function of the court to determine whether what the legisla-
ture said was wise. Their only job is to apply the law as stated. In
this case the Courts appear to have imposed a gloss on the Statute
to bring about what they consider is a just result. In Foss v. Har-
botte'5 it was established that the Court will not at the behest of
33 Supra, footnote 3 at p. 714 (O.R.).
14 [1897] A.C. 22; 66 L.J. Ch. 35.
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a minority, interfere in the internal affairs of a company, when the
irregularity could be cured by ratification by the majority. In this
case the Supreme Court of Canada, having held that the transfer
of shares was incidental to the incorporation of companies by the
Dominion, and therefore part of its internal management, should
I submit, have held that they could not interfere in a transaction
between two independent companies, which could be ratified by the
majority. Whether the deal was "just" or not is irrelevant. The only
question that should have been dealt with by the court was whether
the transaction was "legal". In my submission it was, and the "order
to the contrary" should not have been issued.
M.L.D.
C. CONFLICTS OF LAW
Samson v. Holden, [1963] S.C.R. 373.
On October 20, 1952, a Quebec man while driving his car in the
State of Maine crashed into another car being driven by a resident
of that state. As a result of the accident, the Maine driver died and
thereupon his wife and sons instituted an action for damages against
the Quebec driver in the Province of Quebec. By the law of Maine,
because the victim of the accident died intestate, the action had to be
taken in the name of an administrator. However, the widow and her
sons neglected to do this, though one of the sons, in fact, had been
appointed administrator.
In Samson v. Holden1 the Supreme Court of Canada upon these
facts affirmed the Court of Appeal in Quebec and held the defendant
Samson liable.
The main issue before the Court was whether the action was
enforceable by the plaintiffs from Maine in Quebec. This depended
on two subsidiary problems.
First, how was the court to characterize the law of Maine which
required the administrator to bring the action in his own name?
Fauteux J. who wrote the majority judgment came to the conclusion
that it was a matter of procedure and not capacity.
Je dirais que la pr~ponddrance de Ia preuve sur la loi du Maine 6tablit que
cette disposition de l'article 10 prescivant que l'action droit 8tre postde
par et au non du 'personal representative' en est une de prdcedure. 2
Taschereau J. who dissented stated it was a matter of capacity,
governed by the law of Maine. The learned judge in his judgment
adopted the view of Taschereau J. who likewise dissented in the Court
of Appeal of Quebec. Both judges chose to believe the expert witnesses
for the defendant who testified that the requirement of an administra-
tor was fundamental to the bringing of the action. The majority of
1 [19631 S.C.R. 373.
2 Ibid., at p. 380.
